Pleading Innocents: Laboratory Evidence of Plea Bargaining\u27s Innocence Problem by Edkins, Vanessa & Dervan, Lucian E.
Belmont University
Belmont Digital Repository
Law Faculty Scholarship College of Law
2013
Pleading Innocents: Laboratory Evidence of Plea
Bargaining's Innocence Problem
Vanessa Edkins
Florida Institute of Technology
Lucian E. Dervan
Belmont University - College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.belmont.edu/lawfaculty
Part of the Legal Writing and Research Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Belmont Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Belmont Digital Repository. For more information, please contact repository@belmont.edu.
Recommended Citation
21 Current Research in Social Psychology 14 (2013)
14 
 
 
 
Submitted: October 13, 2012 
Accepted: December 28, 2012 
 
PLEADING INNOCENTS: LABORATORY EVIDENCE OF PLEA 
BARGAINING’S INNOCENCE PROBLEM 
 
Vanessa A. Edkins 
Florida Institute of Technology 
 
Lucian E. Dervan 
Southern Illinois University, School of Law 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We investigated plea bargaining by making students actually guilty or innocent of a cheating 
offense and varying the sentence that they would face if found ‘guilty’ by a review board. As 
hypothesized, guilty students were more likely than innocent students to accept a plea deal (i.e., 
admit guilt and lose credit; akin to accepting a sentence of probation) (Chi-square=8.63, p<.01) 
but we did not find an effect of sentence severity. Innocent students, though not as likely to plead 
as guilty students, showed an overall preference (56% across conditions) for accepting a plea 
deal. Implications and future directions are discussed. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
If the average U.S. citizen were asked to describe the common progression of a criminal case, the 
depiction would likely mirror a Law & Order episode: police investigation, suspect 
apprehension, trial by jury, and a verdict. This script is, in fact, a very uncommon progression; in 
any given year, roughly 90-95% of convictions in criminal cases are obtained through a guilty 
plea (Pastore & Maguire, 2003) with the majority of those pleas presumably worked out through 
plea bargains. 
  
Plea bargains are an efficient way for prosecutors to ensure a favorable disposition of a case, 
without expending the resources required for trial, and for defendants to benefit from a sentence 
recommendation or charge reduction (Tor, Gazal-Ayal, & Garcia, 2010). The benefits are 
obvious with cases in which conviction is a highly probable outcome, but the process is making 
one very important assumption: the defendant is guilty as charged.  
 
Research on Plea Bargaining 
 
Empirical research on plea bargaining has mainly focused on the attorney’s role and decision-
making process (Edkins, 2011; Kramer, Wolbransky, & Heilbrun, 2007), presumably because 
the client’s side is much more difficult to study. Studies looking at pleas from the defendant’s 
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perspective often employ vignettes, and ask participants to imagine themselves as guilty or 
innocent. Using this technique, Gregory, Mowen, and Linder (1978) showed that, not 
surprisingly, ‘guilty’ participants were significantly more likely to accept a plea than ‘innocent’ 
participants (83% compared to 18%).  
 
Gregory et al. (1978) also devised a scenario with more external validity: Students were made to 
be innocent or guilty of the ‘crime’ of having prior knowledge about a test. All students were 
accused and offered a ‘deal’ in which they would admit their guilt and lose participation credit. 
The alternative was to go before an ethics committee and risk a lower final grade. A small 
sample size precludes drawing many inferences from the study, but the majority of ‘guilty’ 
students accepted the deal (6/8) and none of the innocents (0/8). The researchers believed that the 
innocent participants’ refusal to plead guilty stemmed from an optimistic belief that they would 
not be wrongfully ‘convicted’ by the ethics committee.  
 
Bordens (1984), using vignettes and participants imagining themselves as ‘guilty’ or ‘innocent’, 
investigated whether subjects in the Gregory et al. (1978) studies were using an optimizing 
strategy to evaluate plea bargains. Unlike the previous work that did not find ‘innocent’ subjects 
willing to accept a deal, Bordens (1984) showed that ‘innocent’ suspects who fear conviction is 
imminent will show an optimizing strategy; that is, they will choose the option that offers the 
most rewards at the least cost, which means accepting a plea deal (especially if the deal contains 
probation) and avoiding a potentially lengthy prison term. 
 
Tor et al. (2010), using a similar methodology, turned the investigation toward the idea of 
fairness. Individuals weighing plea bargains may consider the substantive fairness (i.e., 
punishing only individuals who are guilty and thus, deserve punishment) and the comparative 
fairness (i.e., the similarity of the current offer to those extended in similar situations in the past) 
when deciding whether to accept or reject. A plea deal for an innocent defendant is inherently 
substantively unfair, and the researchers did find ‘innocent’ individuals overall less likely to 
plead guilty, and more likely to take their chances at trial; innocents were more risk prone, 
preferring the uncertainty of a trial. The findings also provide further support for Bordens (1984) 
claims of optimizing strategies. When the chances of conviction were altered in the vignettes 
(5%, 30%, 50%, 70%, and 95%), ‘innocent’ and ‘guilty’ participants responded differently. The 
sanction for a trial conviction was a 60-month license suspension, and at a 50% chance of 
conviction, only 20% of ‘innocent’ participants (compared to 56% of ‘guilty’ participants) 
accepted a plea to have their licenses suspended for 30 months. Alternatively, at the 95% chance 
of conviction, 50% of ‘innocents’ agreed to a 57-month suspension, but only 41% of ‘guilty’ 
participants. Those who knew they were ‘guilty’ saw the cost of a trial worth the risk, and the 
reward from the plea bargain was not large enough to offset this. 
 
Testing the concept of comparative fairness, Tor et al. (2010) found that ‘guilty’ participants 
offered a deal that was much better than the usual offer in similar cases, accepted approximately 
59% of the time. Similarly, 46% of those actually told they were innocent said they would accept 
the advantageous offer. When the offer was comparatively unfair (i.e., worse than what was 
usually offered in similar cases), plea rates for the ‘guilty’ decreased to 27%, and to 18% for the 
‘innocent.’  
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Akin to this concept of comparative fairness is disparity between the punishment if convicted 
and that implied in the plea offer. The enticement possible in plea deals is a common concern 
(Bibas, 2004), and some argue the resulting sentence differential – the discrepancy between the 
trial conviction sentence and plea negotiated sentence – may force any rational actor (innocent or 
guilty) to choose the plea (Givelber, 2000). Bordens (1984) found that about one third of the 
subjects assuming the role of an innocent defendant were open to accepting a plea bargain when 
the chances of conviction were very high, and as mentioned, one of the most enticing outcomes 
was the offer of a plea bargain that contained no jail time, only probation. Taking the 
investigation into the field, Bordens and Bassett (1985) interviewed defendants convicted 
through pleas; further bolstering the theory of optimizing, 67% stated that they accepted the plea 
to avoid a higher sentence or to secure the least severe punishment they could.  
 
Current Study 
 
The Bordens (1984) and Tor et al. (2010) research lays a solid framework for the psychological 
processes of plea bargains, yet both fall short by not attempting to increase the external validity 
of their studies. Until participants find themselves in a scenario similar to what a defendant faces, 
they cannot know how they would react. Russano, Meissner, Narchet, and Kassin (2005) created 
a paradigm, reminiscent of Gregory et al. (1978), using college students as subjects in 
experiments on interrogations and false confessions. The students were assigned to a ‘guilty’ 
condition where they agree to help out a student (confederate) after being explicitly told that 
working together was not allowed, or an ‘innocent’ condition where they are not approached for 
help. Applied to interrogations, the paradigm cannot truly investigate the effects of specific 
sanctions – police officers are not allowed to promise specific deals so the paradigm needed to 
remain very vague in offers of leniency – but we felt that adopting a similar design for plea 
negotiations could expand the previous research, and allow for the investigation of sentence 
differentials. Expecting to replicate related findings from Russano et al., and from the previous 
plea bargaining research, we hypothesize that students who are guilty will be more likely to 
accept a ‘plea’ deal than those who are innocent. 
 
While the substantive unfairness intrinsic in an innocent defendant pleading guilty should cause 
fewer innocents to plead, we propose that sentencing differentials will produce an optimizing 
strategy, similar to what Bordens (1984) found, and, like their ‘guilty’ counterparts, the harsher 
the punishment attached to a loss at a ‘trial’, the more likely the ‘innocent’ participant will accept 
the deal. This would mean that the diagnotistic ability, or ability to distinguish truth (i.e., a guilty 
person pleading “guilty”) from falsehood (i.e., an innocent person pleading “guilty”), would 
suffer as the sentence differential increased; in other words, the lenient punishment conditions 
should have a higher rate of diagnosticity than the harsh punishment conditions. 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
 
Participants were 82 Introduction to Psychology students from a small, southeastern, private 
technical university. Six students were excluded due to suspicion (N = 2), an inability to finish 
the experiment (N = 2), or a refusal to help the confederate (i.e., refusal to “cheat”; N = 2). 
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Seventy-six students remained (31 female, 45 male). The ethnicity of the sample was 52.6% 
Caucasian, 21.1% African American, 13.2% Hispanic, 5.3% Asian, and 7.9% indicated ‘Other’. 
Forty-eight of the 76 participants were U.S. citizens; 28 were non-citizens.  
   
Design and Procedure 
 
Our procedure was adapted from the false confession paradigm constructed by Russano et al. 
(2005). Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions; two independent 
variables were manipulated: guilt (cheating or no cheating) and sentence if ‘convicted’ (harsh 
punishment or lenient punishment).  
 
A confederate and the participant were lead into a private room by one of our experimenters. 
Informed consent was obtained and participants filled out a short demographic sheet. The 
experimenter then explained that we were studying performance on logic problems and whether 
people work better alone or in pairs and the study would be completed in two parts. First, the two 
would be left alone and would work together to solve three logic problems. Subsequent to this, 
they would be asked to work separately to solve three more (they were told that it was imperative 
they work alone on the second set). The logic problems were multiple-choice, based off of a 
practice LSAT test. In the guilty condition, the confederate would ask for assistance on the 
problems that were to be solved individually (repeated a maximum of three times). In the 
innocent condition, no assistance was requested. 
 
The experimenter, blind to guilt condition, would take the logic problems and leave the room. 
After 5 minutes, the experimenter would return and declare, “We have a problem. I’m going to 
need to speak with each of you individually” and would request that the confederate leave the 
room with him or her. Five minutes later, the experimenter would return and say, “You and the 
other student had the same wrong answer on the second and third individual questions. The 
chances of you getting the exact same wrong answer are really small – in fact they are like less 
than 4% - because of this, when this occurs, we are required to report it to the professor in charge 
and she may consider this a form of academic dishonesty.” Two of the three logic problems had 
no correct answer in order to ensure students would not be suspicious. The experimenter then 
told the participant that this situation has arisen before and the experimenters have been given 
authority to offer participants two alternatives.  
 
The alternatives offered included a “plea”, the same in all conditions, in which the participant 
would admit to working with the other student and would lose all compensation (research 
credits), structured to mirror a plea offer of probation: sign this deal, and you get to go home. 
Participants were then offered a second choice: have the professor in charge bring the incident to 
an Academic Review Board (described as a 10-12 person board consisting of faculty and staff; 
akin to a jury in the criminal justice system). In the harsh sentence condition, participants were 
told that if they lost at the Board, they would lose today’s compensation and they would have to 
enroll in a 3-credit class on ethics (free of charge, mandatory weekly attendance, paper 
requirement, graded on pass/fail basis). In the lenient sentence condition, participants were told 
the same, but the 3-credit class was replaced with 9 hours of ethics training (mandatory 
attendance, graded on a pass/fail basis).  
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In order to make the likelihood of prevailing similar to the likelihood of prevailing in an actual 
trial, the experimenter said of the Academic Review Board, “the majority of students, like 80-
90%, are usually found guilty.”  This last statement was included to avoid the overly optimistic 
outlook of innocent participants that was found in the Gregory et al. (1978) study, to mirror the 
actual conviction rates of defendants who choose to take their case to trial (Administrative Office 
of the United States Courts, 2010), and to reflect the trial conviction rates (86%) found with 
innocent defendants (Drizin & Leo, 2004) Also, in a small pilot test, we had found that our 
participants were overly optimistic about their chances at a trial (of 28 ‘innocent’ participants, 19 
chose to take their case to the review board). 
 
Following the participant’s choice, participants were probed for suspicion and a thorough debrief 
was employed. The experimenter made sure that the participant left the study feeling at ease and 
with an understanding of why deception was necessary. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Participants did not differ in their decisions to plea based on gender, Chi-square (1, N=76) = 
0.24, p = 0.63; ethnicity, Chi-square (4, N=76) = 0.51, p = 0.97; citizenship status, Chi-square (1, 
N=76) = 0.16, p = 0.90; or English as a first language, Chi-square (1, N=76) = 0.34,  p= 0.56. 
Plea decisions also did not differ by experimenter Chi-square (1, N=76) = 0.83, p = 0.36. 
Reported results are collapsed across all of the previously mentioned groups. 
 
We conducted a hierarchical loglinear analysis to test the effects of guilt (guilt vs. innocence) 
and type of punishment (lenient vs. harsh) on decision to accept the plea bargain. The interaction 
was not significant, Chi-square (1, N = 76) = 0.26, p = 0.61, nor was the main effect for 
punishment, Chi-square (1, N = 76) = 0.75, p = 0.39. The main effect for guilt was significant, 
Chi-square (1, N = 76) = 10.95, p < 0.001. To break down this effect, a separate Chi-square test 
was performed looking at guilt and plea, collapsed across type of punishment. Applying the 
continuity correction for a 2 x 2 contingency table, there was a significant effect of guilt, Chi-
square (1, N = 76) = 8.63, p < 0.01, with the odds ratio indicating that those who were guilty 
were 6.39 times more likely to accept a plea than those who were innocent. Interestingly, while 
89.2% of our guilty participants chose a plea, 56.4% of our innocent participants did as well. See 
Table 1 for plea acceptance rates. 
 
Table 1. Rates of Accepting and Rejecting the Plea Offer, by Condition 
 
 ‘Innocent’ Participants ‘Guilty’ Participants 
 Accepted Rejected Accepted Rejected 
Punishment % n % n % n % n 
Lenient 52.4 11 47.6 10 85 17 15 3 
Harsh 61.1 11 38.9 7 94.1 16 5.9 1 
 
Since we had predicted a difference in plea rates based on the severity of the punishment the 
student would face if found “guilty” by an academic review board, we went ahead and calculated 
the diagnosticity of the type of punishment even though the effect of punishment was not 
significant.  We hypothesized that a punishment close to the punishment agreed to in the plea 
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bargain would have a higher rate of diagnosticity; that is, a lenient punishment would have a 
higher rate of diagnosticity than a harsh punishment. Diagnosticity was calculated for the 
punishment conditions by comparing the rate of guilty people accepting pleas to the rate of 
innocent people accepting pleas. Although the diagnosticity for the lenient punishment (1.62) 
was larger than that for the harsh punishment (1.54), the diagnosticity for both punishment levels 
was quite low and the difference between the two levels is too small to deem significant (Table 
2). 
 
Table 2. Rates of Pleas and Diagnosticity by Punishment Condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The paradigm employed here allowed us to mimic the psychological constructs present when 
someone is falsely accused of committing an act (though, obviously, to a much lesser degree than 
what would be experienced by an innocent person accused of committing an actual criminal act) 
and study exactly how the proffer of a quick way out – coupled with a reduced penalty – can 
affect decisions.  
 
Previous research (Tor et al., 2010) has suggested that ‘innocent’ defendants will be less likely to 
accept a plea deal, and more likely to be risk seeking, preferring the uncertainty of a trial, 
because pleading to a crime one did not commit is inherently an unfair proposition. We did not 
find this to be the case – in both of our ‘innocent’ conditions, participants were more likely to 
accept a plea than to take their case to trial. 
 
We had hope to use sentencing differentials to show that our participants were engaging in 
optimizing strategies similar to those displayed in the previous literature, but unfortunately, there 
was no significant effect for this variable. While our manipulation of punishment severity did not 
have an effect, we of course cannot say that sentencing differentials are not important. The null 
result can only show that our manipulation did not uncover an effect of differentials, if the effect 
does exist. Diagnosticity tests suggested that we may have been on the right track but deficient in 
the power needed to make any claims (see Table 2). While the two punishments seemed more 
than adequately different (three, three hour seminars compared to a semester-long class with a 
paper requirement), perhaps we should have focused more on what the punishments have in 
common that would be avoided with a plea deal – the experience of the academic review board. 
Considering we had ‘innocent’ participants more willing to take a plea bargain than to defend 
themselves in front of the review board, knowing full well that they did not commit an act of 
academic dishonesty, perhaps the very nature of the plea we used made the costs of a trial 
outweigh the benefits for both of our sanctions; choosing a plea may have reflected an 
optimizing strategy for all conditions. Unfortunately, we did not have students rate their 
 
Condition 
Guilty accepting 
the plea 
Innocent accepting 
the plea 
Diagnosticity 
Lenient 
punishment 
85% 52.4% 1.62 
Harsh punishment 94.1% 61.1% 1.54 
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perception of the sentence severity so we cannot properly assess that the difference between our 
punishments was significantly large. Further research will need to parse out this possible 
confound. 
 
Another limitation of the study is that it addresses plea deals without one important actor: the 
defense attorney. While our study may have more external validity than the previous research 
asking participants to imagine that they are guilty, the presence of legal counsel may add another 
dimension to the decision. Yet, the paradigm employed here may not be far off from reality: In 
our criminal justice system the “right to counsel” is seriously lacking. The American Bar 
Association (2005) concluded that “thousands of persons are processed through America’s courts 
every year either with no lawyer at all or with a lawyer who does not have the time, resources, or 
in some cases the inclination to provide effective representation.” (p. 4).  Still, a future direction 
for this research could include somehow creating a role to provide the student with legal 
counseling.  
 
The innocence problem in plea bargaining needs to be recognized. Aside from the one, eight-
person condition in the Gregory et al. (1978) study, previous empirical research has 
demonstrated that guilty pleas can be elicited from a substantial percentage of innocent people 
(Bordens, 1984; Tor et al., 2010). The current study has built on the previous research by moving 
the findings into a realm that more closely matches the psychological constructs present when a 
person is falsely accused of a crime. With confidence, we can now state that the innocent are at 
risk. 
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